ABSTRACT Recently, the popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to a rapid development and significant advancement of ubiquitous applications seamlessly integrated within our daily life. Owing to the accompanying growth of the importance of privacy, a great deal of attention has focused on the issues of secure management and robust access control of IoT devices. In this paper, we propose the design of a blockchain connected gateway which adaptively and securely maintains user privacy preferences for IoT devices in the blockchain network. Individual privacy leakage can be prevented because the gateway effectively protects users' sensitive data from being accessed without their consent. A robust digital signature mechanism is proposed for the purposes of authentication and secure management of privacy preferences. Furthermore, we adopt the blockchain network as the underlying architecture of data processing and maintenance to resolve privacy disputes.
FIGURE 1. Example of user with wearables.
production process. All of the collected data is forwarded to the cloud cluster and analyzed to deliver a set of intelligent functionalities for managers (or workers) to optimize the production processes via appropriate resource-utilization. Nevertheless, it is indispensable to embed an appropriate data management mechanism into the system for organizational privacy protection.
While the IoT promises new opportunities for innovative service applications and business models through effective use of next-generation mobile devices, it also brings with it many challenges with respect to privacy issues. In recent years, several governmental agencies, such as the EU Article 29 Working Party and the American FTC (Federal Trade Commission) [1] - [2] , have recommended that IoT application providers notify users of application privacy policies or even obtain user consent before personal data is collected and processed. On the other hand, a move toward a Privacy by Design (PbD) legal framework has been recommended [3] , [4] , in which seven major principles constitute a fundamental framework for privacy-aware applications (or audit services). These principles are: (1) proactive not reactive, preventative not remedial (2) privacy as the default (3) privacy embedded into design (4) full functionality -positive -sum, not zero -sum (5) end-to-end security -lifecycle protection (6) visibility and transparency, and (7) respect for user privacy. To follow the above 6 th and 7 th principles, many researchers have dedicated their efforts to allowing application provider to negotiate with users to reach appropriate privacy agreements [5] - [7] , or to the design and implementation of privacy-aware IoT systems [8] - [10] . Although these studies offer good practical privacy solutions, a fundamental limitation exists in all of them. That is, significant modifition of existing (or legacy) IoT devices may be required to support the operation logic for privacy protection (or policy management) presented by the researchers [5] - [10] . Modifying (or even replaceing) existing IoT devices to support any newly proposed processes may entail a significant rise in cost.
In light of the foregoing, this study designs and proposes a privacy-aware Blockchain Connected Gateway (BC gateway), where the blockchain network is adopted as the underlying architecture for management of privacy preferences. That is, the proposed BC gateway uses blockchain technology to protect and manage the maintained user preferences from being tampered with. Therefore, the BC gateway enhances user privacy protection while legacy IoT devices are in use. In addition, the blockchain-based user preference management scheme is useful for solving disputes between users and IoT application providers when it comes to privacy practices. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we provide the operation scenario of the proposed BC gateway. Section III illustrates the detailed functions of the proposed BC gateway, including the device binding process, the proposed digital signature scheme and the procedure for preserving privacy preferences. Next, we perform the security analysis and perfromance evaluation in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V. 
II. OPERATION SCENARIO: THE OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we demonstrate a broad overview of the functionalities of the proposed BC gateway, as shown in Fig. 3 , with a scenario provided to illustrate the functions of the proposed scheme. In general, there are three main types of participants in the scenario involving our proposed BC gateway: (1) the owners or administrators of IoT devices, (2) the BC gateway administrators, and (3) the end users. Before a user can access an IoT device, the administrator of the device can store device information and the privacy policies of the device in the blockchain network. In general, the device information includes a list consisting of: (1) an unique device name (2) manufacture related information (3) features of the device such as device type, device model name and number, serial number and so on, and (4) other attributes for management purposes, such as list of device images, privacy policies, and services provided. On the other hand, privacy policy includes a policy identifier, and preference-related information (i.e. data collector, access, and dispute). In this study, we define the privacy policies in JSON-based machine readable format. The Ethereum blockchain platform was chosen for this study because of its ability to execute and enforce smart contracts. 1 Therefore, the administrator of an IoT device can create a smart contract for the device and use the smart contract to manage the device's information and privacy policies (Step 0a).
This study also defines the smart contract for a BC gateway. The administrator of a BC gateway can create a smart contract for the gateway (Step 0b). After connecting the gateway to an IoT device physically, the gateway administrator will link the smart contract of the device to the smart contract of the gateway (Step 0c). When a user uses his/her smartphone to connect to a BC gateway (Step 1), the user can obtain the address of the gateway's smart contract. Then, the user can query the list of devices connected to the gateway from the gateway's smart contract (Step 2). Hereafter, the user can retrieve the address of an IoT device's smart contract and fetch device information and privacy policies via the device's smart contract (Step 3).
After receiving the privacy policies of an IoT device, a user can connect to the associated BC gateway and notify the gateway that he/she accepts or declines the policies (Step 4). In addition to storing the preference data in the gateway (Step 5), the gateway further preserves the preference data in the blockchain network (Step 6). Consequently, when the user accesses the IoT device via the gateway (Step 7 and
Step 8), the gateway will process user requests based on the preserved user preferences. In the above scenario, the BC gateway will utilize the blockchain technology to protect the user preferences and privacy policy, and thus eliminate disputes involving privacy practices.
III. THE PROPOSED BC GATEWAY
In this section, we depict the architecture of the BC gateway as shown in Figure 4 . The BC gateway identifies users and user preferences based on the accounts in the blockchain network. Therefore, a user can use the same account to connect to different BC gateways, rather than registering for each gateway. As major smartphone platforms such as Android and iOS have supported the BLE specification, BLE has become the de facto standard for smartphones to communicate with wearable devices and with nearby IoT devices. This study focuses on the scenario wherein a user accesses nearby BLE-based devices. In the current state of the art, the BC gateways provide a REST-like interface for users to access BLE-based devices with the following commands:
• Lock / unlock a BLE device.
• Discover devices connected to the gateways and services provided by the devices.
• Send read or write requests to a characteristic of a BLE device.
• Request to receive notification or indication of a BLE device's characteristic. The BC gateways will maintain connectivity to related IoT devices. Therefore, the gateways can play the roles of mediators to forward requests to specified devices and integrate responses from the devices. Finally, the BC gateways provides interfaces for users to manage their privacy preferences and determine whether personal data can be forwarded to an IoT device based on the user's preferences.
A. DEVICE BINDING Fig. 5 demonstrates the process for a device administrator to register a device with a BC gateway. Before creating a smart contract of an IoT device, the device administrator invokes transactions to store device information and associated privacy policies. Then, the administrator can create a VOLUME 6, 2018 DeviceManager corresponding to the device with the addresses of the device information and privacy policies. As illustrated in Fig. 6 , users can obtain device information and privacy policies of a device based on the associated public variables of the device's DeviceManager. In addition, users can listen for events of device updating.
After creating a DeviceManager, the device administrator can obtain the address of the smart contract. Then, the device administrator can provide the address to a gateway administrator. Therefore, the gateway administrator can submit a request to bind the device to the GatewayManager of a BC gateway with the address of the DeviceManager.
Fig . 7 provides the abstract interface of a GatewayManager. Upon receiving a request to bind a device, a GatewayManager will invoke the bindRequest method of the associated DeviceManager. The DeviceManager then notifies its administrator to decide whether to accept the request. If the administrator accepts the request, the DeviceManager smart contract records the address of the GatewayManager. Therefore, a user can ensure that the device administrator has confirmed the binding relationship between the device and the gateway.
B. THE PROPOSED DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEME (PDSS)
This section presents our proposed signature scheme (hereinafter PDSS). The security of the scheme is based on the intractability of ECDLP and the robustness of bilinear pairing. In general, the proposed signature scheme consists of six phases, i.e. Setup, Set-Partial-Private-Key, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Public-Key, Sign and Verify. Let the notation E/E p denote an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field E p , defined by an equation: y 2 = x 3 +ax+b, where a, b ∈ F p are constants such that = 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 = 4a 3 27b 2 = 0. All points P i = (x i , y i ) on E and the infinity point O form a cyclic group G under the operation of point addition R = P + Q defined based on the chord-and-tangent rule. In addition, we define t · P = P + P + . . . + P (t times) as scalar multiplication, where P is a generator of G with order n. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is defined as follows: given a group G of elliptic curve points with prime order n, a generator P of G and a point x · P, it is computationally infeasible to derive x, where x ∈ Z * n . Moreover, Let G 1 and G 2 be the cyclic group with the same prime order q where G 1 is an additive cyclic group and G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group. Let e :
ab . Given a secure parameter k, BC gateway(BCG) chooses two groups G 1 and G 2 with the same prime order q and a bilinear pairing e:
where P is a generator of G 1 . Next, BCG chooses a random number s ∈ Z * q as its master private key and then computes its corresponding master public key PK BCG = s · P. After that, BCG chooses three secure hash functions, i.e.
as public parameters.
2) SET-PARTIAL-PRIVATE-KEY
Given the public parameters, i.e. Params = {G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P, PK BCG , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , e(P, P), master private key s, and the user U i 's identity ID i , BCG generates a random number r i ∈ Z * q and calculates i ·P Then, BCG sends the partial private key (R i , σ i 1 ) back to the user. Upon receiving (R i , σ i 1 ) from BCG, the user U i verifies the validity of the incoming message via the following equations:
and Check if
If the verification holds, the user U i believes that the partial private key is valid. The correctness of the verification is
= e(P, P)
(r i +h i ·s) = e(P, P)
3) SET-SECRET-VALUE
Given Param, the user U i chooses a random number x i ∈ Z * q as his/her secret value.
4) SET-PUBLIC-KEY
Given Params and x i , the user U i sets PK i = x i · P as his/her public key.
5) SIGN
Given Params, (s i , R i ), h i , x i , PK i and a message m, the user U i computes
and
After that, the user returns (m, R i , σ i 2 )to the verifier as the signature of m.
6) VERIFY
Given Params, PK i and (m, R i , σ i 2 ), the verifier computes
Next, the verifier verifies the validity of the signature σ i 2 via the following equation:
If the aforementioned equation holds, the signature σ i 2 is valid. The correctness of the verification is
= e (P, P)
Since user preferences are stored in the blockchain network, user privacy and data confidentiality should be considered. Among different confidentiality and privacy preserving technologies for blockchains [11] , this study lets the BC gateway encrypt user preference on the user's behalf and store the encrypted user preference in the blockchain network. Fig. 8 illustrates the process for a user to express his/her privacy preference on an IoT device. A gateway has a root key K to encrypt user preferences. As shown in Fig. 8 , when the gateway receives a user U i 's privacy preference PP j on a privacy policy P j , the gateway will generate a nonce N i Hereafter, the gateway can obtain a transaction ID TID ij for the transaction that stores the message. Therefore, the gateway can provide the transaction ID to its smart contract. Finally, the gateway transfers the transaction ID (i.e. TID ij ) and the key (i.e. K N i U i P j ) to the user so that the user can verify that his/her privacy preference is really stored in the blockchain network.
D. INTELLIGENT ACCESS CONTROL ON
IoT DEVICES (e.g., Fig. 9) Once the user U i would like to perform a service corresponding to a set of IoT devices, U i produces a signature on the privacy preference PP j . That is, given Params,
, and s i = r i + h i · s. After that, the user sends (PP j , R i , σ ij )to the BCG as the signature of PP j . After that, BCG computes h i = H 1 (ID i , R i , PK BCG ) and k ij = H 2 (ID i , PK i , R i , PK BCG , PP j ) with a given dataset including Params, PK i and (PP j , R i , σ ij ). Next, BCG verifies the validity of the signature σ ij via the following equation: if e σ ij , k ij · (R i + h i · PK BCG ) + PK i = e (P, P)? If the aforementioned equation holds, the signature σ ij is valid. 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of PDSS and smart contract management on the Ethereum blockchain platform to examine the practicability of our proposed BC gateway.
A. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PDSS
We implement each security component of PDSS on a popular IoT-based testbed, i.e. Raspberry PI III Model B, and calculate the corresponding computation cost. Table 1 presents the implementation environment, where Raspberry PI III is simulated as a smart device and all of the security components are programmed via Oracle Java 8 and Eclipse 3.8. Based on the experiment results, Table 2 shows the computation cost of each security module adopted in PDSS. For each signature signing and verification in PDSS, we require a one-way hash function (SHA-512 with input 1000 bits) to be performed three times, ECC pairing (384 bits) to be performed once, ECC point multiplication (384 bits) to be performed four times, and ECC point addition (384 bits) to be performed three times. The total computation cost of PDSS is nearly 283 ms, which is practical and reasonable for application development in real world.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED BC GATEWAY
In this section, we implement a prototype system to verify the practical potential of the proposed BC gateway. The experimental environment contains three entities, i.e. the Ethereum network, the BC gateway and the client application.
First, we construct a private Ethereum network, which is executed on a desktop with Intel Core i7-3770 3.4GHz CPU and 16GB RAM running Windows 10. In the experiment, we fix the mining difficulty to 0x4000. Second, the BC Gateway is simulated on the NVIDIA Shield TV with NVIDIA R Tegra R X1 processor and 3G RAM. The NVIDIA Shield TV is not only a simple game console (or streaming device) but acts as a hub for the home which can handle the requests and the responses of the IoT devices. Third, the client application is implemented on users' smartphone, where an LG Nexus 5X with Android 8.0 (Oreo) is adopted. The interface of the client application can be utilized for users to express (or input) their privacy preferences. We summary all of the above detailed specifications in Table 3 . In the following, we demonstrate our implementation and the corresponding screenshot as shown in Figures 10-16 . Note that in our experiment, the access to the IoT device is strictly controlled based on the privacy policy. Without the user's consent, access is not allowed to the IoT device. The device administrator will first invoke a transaction to store device information and the associated privacy policies. Then the administrator can create a DeviceManager smart contract of the device with the addresses of the device information and privacy policies. After getting the address of the smart contract, the device administrator can provide the address to a gateway administrator. Next, the gateway administrator keys in the address of the DeviceManager smart contract and invokes a request to bind the device to the GatewayManager smart contract of a BC gateway, which is showed in Figure 10 . Then the device administrator will receive this binding request and decide whether to accept, which is illustrated in Figure 11 . If the device administrator accepts the request, the DeviceManager smart contract will record the address of the GatewayManager and finish the binding process. A successful binding will be launched as shown in Figure 12 . Now the users is able to ensure that the device administrator has confirmed the binding relationship between the device and the gateway.
Afterwards, the administrators can view the information and privacy policies of the device connected to the BC gateway, which are displayed in Figure 13 and Figure 14 . The format of the privacy policy is represented by Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P), which provides the description for the collection and use of data. On the other hand, the user can use his/her smartphone to connect to the BC gateway and also view the information and privacy policies of the device, which are depicted in Figure 15 and Figure 16 . Further, the user will utilize the application of the smartphone showed in Figure 16 to decide whether or not to agree with the privacy policies of an IoT device.
C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SMART CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
To evaluate the performance of the operations of the smart contract, we execute our experiment on a Asus ZenBook UX430UQ with Intel Core TM i7-7500U processor, 16GB 2133MHz DDR4 RAM, and 1T SATA3 M.2 SSD. The experiment is conducted as illustrated in Fig. 17 , in which three major components, i.e. client-side application, geth node and backend application server, are designed. First, this study implements a client-side application with JDK 8u151, and a server side Web application using JDK 8u151 and Java EE 7. In addition, we deploy the server side application on a Tomcat 8.0.27 Web application server (listening on port 8080). Finally, this study adopts Geth v1.7 to launch a single node Ethereum private chain. The node listens to JSON-RPC requests on the 8101 port. This study embeds a Geth wallet file in the client side application. Therefore, we can obtain the public/private key pair and the associated wallet address from the file. Similarly, this study embeds an another Geth wallet file in the server side application. The performance is measured via the following metrics T1 to T5. Note that for each of the metrics, we perform the experiment 10 times and retrieve an average value as the experiment results.
• Criterion T1 models the following processes. First, the client sends its id, public key and a random number r1 to the application server. The server then exploits the elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm to generate a shared key K with the client's public key and the server's private key. Next, the server generates a random number r2, and encrypts the random numbers r1 and r2 with K . Note that the encryption algorithm is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). After that, the server sends the encrypted message E K (r1, r2) with the server's public key to the client. The above processes are represented as criterion T1. Based on our experiment, we obtain an average time of 28 ms for T1.
• For criterion T2, the client uses its private key and the server's public key to generate the shared key K via the ECDH algorithm. Then, the client decrypts E K (r1, r2) and retrieves r2. Finally, the client computes E K (r2) and sends E K (r2) to the server. Once the server decrypts E K (r2) and verifies r2, the server will sends a success (or failure) acknowledgement to the client based on the verification result. The above processes are represented as criterion T2. According to our experiment results, we get an average time of 15 ms for T2.
• Criterion T3 models the client producing a digest and a digital signature of an agreement, as shown in Fig. 18 , with a size of 2K bytes. In our experiment, the hash function is the SHA-256 algorithm, and the digital signature scheme is the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). An average time of 8 ms is calculated for T3.
• Criterion T4 models the processes of uploading a smart contract to the server, and then the storing of this smart contract in the blockchain by the server. The computation time required for T4 is 15068 ms (around 15 secs) on average. • Criterion T5 represents the data query process for a smart contract at the server side. The experiment results show that retrieving a smart contract from the blockchain requires 1399 ms, on average.
V. CONCLUSION
To enable IoT service providers to obtain user consent on privacy policies without modifying (or replacing) legacy IoT devices immediately, this study has proposed the Blockchain Connected Gateway. The BC gateway plays the role of a mediator between users and IoT devices: users can obtain the device information and privacy policies of an IoT device connected to a BC gateway and access the device via the BC gateway rather than accessing the device directly. Therefore, the BC gateway can prevent the device from obtaining sensitive personal data unless users accept the privacy policies of the device. Moreover, the BC gateway will store a user's preference regarding privacy policies in the blockchain network. Because data stored in the blockchain network are tamperresistant, user preference data stored in the blockchain network can be utilized to resolve disputes between users and IoT service providers. Therfore, this paper can contribute to improving user privacy and trust in IoT applications while legacy IoT devices are still in use. VOLUME 6, 2018 
